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 Grammar 
 Phil  Hutchinson and  Rupert  Read 
 ‘ We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete 
 grammar of a word. But  there is no such thing as a completed grammar .’ 
(Emphasis ours) 
 Wittgenstein, AWL, 21 
 If you are someone with a little familiarity with Wittgenstein ’ s philosophy, but no 
more, it might well be that you know him best through having heard of some of 
his famous  ‘ terms of art ’ : language-games,  ‘ private language ’, family resemblance 
concepts  – and logical grammar. Th is article concerns the last of these. What 
does Wittgenstein mean when he talks of the task of the philosopher being 
in some way akin to the task of the grammarian? Th at is the focal concern of 
this article. We will reach that focus in an  ‘ indirect ’ fashion, via thinking about 
the infl uences on Wittgenstein ’ s thought and the context of that thought in the 
cultural milieu of his time. 
 When one delves into Wittgenstein ’ s biography and development as a thinker, 
one fi nds an ongoing engagement and dialogue with modernism, including with 
many of the forefathers and contemporary representatives of modernism. When 
one looks, for instance, at the signifi cant infl uence of the Marxist economist 
Sraff a on the development of Wittgenstein ’ s later thought, or (still more 
obviously) at his interest in Adolf Loos and his own remarkable architectural 
work in Vienna, 1 one is left  in little doubt that Wittgenstein was a thinker whose 
thought should be, to a signifi cant extent, understood as deeply engaged with 
modernism  – albeit idiosyncratically and critically. 2 
1 On which, see for example, Peter Galison,  ‘Aufb au/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural 
Modernism ’,  Critical Inquiry vol. 16, no. 4 (Summer, 1990): 709 − 52. For Wittgenstein, the elimination 
of pointless ornament and a constant striving for an honest, exact (and exacting) presentation of 
matters was a moral imperative  – in architecture, in work on the self and in philosophical writing. 
As one can see, if one reads his  Culture and Value , he saw all three of these, in fact, as  – in their 
essentials  – one. 
2 In this latter connection, see, especially, the fi nal footnote to this article. 
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 And then there is Freud. For, while it is true that Wittgenstein writes of Freud 
that he is emblematic of a decline in our culture 3 and that psychoanalysis is a 
 ‘ powerful mythology ’ that is likely to do harm (LC, 51f.), he also called himself 
nothing less than a  disciple of Freud 4 and incorporated central elements of the 
therapeutic method into his philosophical practice. 
 Compare the following two quotes: 
 Diffi  culty of Philosophy not the intellectual diffi  culty of the sciences, but the 
diffi  culty of a change of attitude. Resistances of the will must be overcome.  
 … What makes a subject diffi  cult to understand  – if it is signifi cant, 
important   – is not that some special instruction about abstruse things is 
necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast between the understanding 
of the subject and what most people want to see. Because of this the very things 
that are most obvious can become the most diffi  cult to understand. What 
has to be overcome is not diffi  culty of the intellect but of the will. [Nicht eine 
Schwierigkeit des Verstandes, sondern des Willens ist zu  ü berwinden.] (P, 161) 
 Th e pathogenic idea which has ostensibly been forgotten is always lying  ‘ close 
at hand ’ and can be reached by associations that are easily accessible. It is merely 
a question of getting some obstacle out of the way. Th is obstacle seems  … to be 
the subject ’ s will. (Freud,  ‘ Psychotherapy of Hysteria ’ ) 5 
 So how should one understand Wittgenstein ’ s relationship to that high priest 
of modernism, Sigmund Freud? Did he accept Freud ’ s reduction of much in 
human life to sex? No, he thought it a crudifi cation, a reductivism  – and at the 
same time, an overcomplication: Wittgenstein remarks tellingly that Freud 
never talks about explicitly sexual dreams, which are as  ‘ common as rain ’. 6 
Did he accept Freud ’ s theory of the mind? No; he thought it, too, a scientistic 
crudifi cation. Overall, his verdict on Freud was harsh: he considered Freud a 
myth-maker masquerading as a scientist, and he thought the myths likely to 
harm those coming under their power. 
 What then did Wittgenstein owe to Freud that justifi ed so strong a term as 
 ‘ disciple ’ ? Why did he famously speak (in PI, 133) of his method(s) in philosophy 
as  ‘ so to speak ’ a therapy or therapies? 
3 See M. O ’ C. Drury,  ‘ Conversations with Wittgenstein ’, in  Recollections of Wittgenstein , ed. Rush 
Rhees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 112. 
4 See Rhees ’ s comment, ibid., 41. 
5 Z. Freud,  Th e Complete Psychological Works (New York: Vintage, 2001), vol. 2, 271. 
6 Freud,  Complete Psychological Works , 47. 
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 Basically, because Wittgenstein owed a crucial aspect of his philosophical 
method to Freud. His actual approach to the  doing of philosophy. Wittgenstein 
fi gured philosophy as akin in its practice to psychotherapy, to psychoanalysis. 
 Where previous philosophers had mostly engaged in theorizing, Wittgenstein 
sought a kind of fl uidity  – a willingness to go wherever the prose needed, in 
pursuit of clarity and of the right level of depth  – in his writing and his thinking 
and his interaction with others, a fl uidity that was infl uenced by the dynamic 
practice of psychoanalysis, in particular, the idea that the acceptance by the 
 ‘ analysand ’ of the analyst ’ s interpretations was a  criterion for their correctness. 
Th ere was/is no room in Wittgenstein for interpretations or descriptions being 
imposed onto others. 7 
 In this way, Wittgenstein made  philosophy  – its practice (whether on another 
or on oneself), its writing,  new . Modern, if you will. And, in his central insistence 
on writing eff ectively, on seeking  ‘ the liberating word ’, 8 the intervention that 
could help one to escape the prison of one ’ s dogmatic assumptions or one ’ s 
intuitive certainties or one ’ s theoretical leanings, he achieved a form of writing 
that had no direct precedent. 
 Wittgenstein ’ s explicitly  ‘ methodological ’ remarks show how this Freudian 
legacy should be taken 9 and why  ‘ therapy ’ and  ‘ liberation ’ are apt terms via which 
to characterize Wittgenstein ’ s approach to philosophy. For example, consider the 
following remark: 
 We can only convict another person of a mistake  … if he (really) acknowledges 
this expression as the correct expression of his feeling.//For only if he 
acknowledges it as such,  is it the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis) 10 
 Th is is pretty unequivocal. It makes clear that the person in question is the 
ultimate authority for the successful resolution of the problem. Compare this 
remark with the following: 
7 And Wittgenstein thought that Freud himself violated this crucial point, when he (Freud) became 
scientistic. 
8 See especially WVC, 77, for this key phrase. 
9 See on this front the well-known PI passages; passages such as 133 (see in particular Read ’ s  ‘ Th e Real 
Philosophical Discovery ’,  Philosophical Investigations (1995): 130 − 2. See our  ‘ Towards a Perspicuous 
Presentation of  “ Perspicuous Presentation ” ’ ,  Philosophical Investigations 31, no. 2 (2008): 108, 116 
and 120. See also the chapters by each of the authors of the present chapter, in addition to our 
co-authored chapter, in Jolley (ed.),  Wittgenstein: Key Concepts . 
10  Th e Big Typescript , 410. For more detail on the parallel with psychoanalysis, see the relevant chapters 
of Baker ’ s  Wittgenstein ’ s Method (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). One might also look at O. K. Bouwsma ’ s 
outlining of a person-specifi c Wittgensteinian therapy, modelled on psychoanalysis: see Bouwsma, 
 ‘A Diff erence Between Wittgenstein and Ryle ’, in  Towards a New Sensibility , eds. J. L. Craft  and R .E. 
Hustwit (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 17 − 32. 
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 It is a long superseded idea  … that the patient suff ers from a sort of ignorance, 
and that if one remove this ignorance by giving him information  … he is bound 
to recover. Th e pathological factor is not his ignorance itself, but the root of this 
ignorance in his inner resistances; it was they that fi rst called this ignorance into 
being, and they still maintain it now. Th e task of the treatment lies in combating 
these resistances. (Freud, Complete Works, vol. 11, 225) 11 
 Th is, we are suggesting, is the very core of Wittgenstein ’ s promotion of the 
therapeutic analogy for philosophy. It is what makes Wittgenstein a successor to 
the Enlightenment project: Freedom is something that cannot be given to one. 
One must attain it for oneself. It is also precisely what makes Wittgenstein in this 
one key regard a true successor to Freud. 
 Consider some further remarks of Wittgenstein ’ s: 
 We do not call a  ‘ rule of grammar ’ a law of nature to which the course of language 
conforms, but a rule  which a speaker states as a rule of  his language . 12 (VoW, 
103 – 5, our emphases) 
 One can only determine the grammar of a language  with the consent of a 
speaker, but not the orbit of the stars with the consent of the stars.  Th e rule for 
a sign, then, is the rule which the speaker commits himself to .//Th is commitment 
to a rule is also the end of a philosophical investigation. For instance, if one 
has cleared away the scruples about the word  ‘ is ’ by making two or three signs 
available to a person instead of the one, then  everything would now depend on his 
commitment to this rule:  ε is not to be replaced by =. (VoW, 105) 13 
 Here then is the fullness of the diff erence between science and philosophy to 
which, we submit, Wittgenstein is committed. Our claim here draws upon what 
we have already suggested is the radically non-scientistic stance involved in 
Freud ’ s vision of psychoanalysis, before Freud himself corrupted and sought to 
eff ect a kind of re-scientizing of psychoanalysis. What is radical is the requirement 
of acknowledgement by the  ‘ therapee ’ of the therapist ’ s interpretations, which is 
considered as a  criterion for the truth of those interpretations. 
11 Of course, this quotation is as yet not clear on whether the task of combatting resistances can be 
 ‘ farmed out ’ to the analyst. Th is is why Wittgenstein said (LC, 42):  ‘ Sometimes [Freud] says that the 
right solution, or the right analysis, is the one which satisfi es the patient. Sometimes he says that the 
doctor knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream is whereas the patient doesn ’ t ’  – here, 
in the latter case, there is a danger of analysis becoming a kind of authoritarian cult. 
12 Gordon Baker (ed.),  Voices of Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2003). [Henceforth VoW] 
13 See also, VoW,  ‘ On the Character of Disquiet ’, 69 − 77; cf. also 233 − 7, 277 − 9, and 303 − 5. See also 
Baker,  Wittgenstein ’ s Method , 55ff . 
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 One way of putting our central point is this: the gulf in purpose and methods 
between the natural sciences and philosophy that Wittgenstein over and over 
again wished his readers and students to understand has (nevertheless) not 
suffi  ciently been understood. As with so many of the diff erences that Wittgenstein 
meant to teach (between fi nite and infi nite, mind and body, etc.), there has been 
a tendency to assimilate the two terms, to make one more akin to the other than 
they actually are. 
 It can be tempting to read Wittgenstein ’ s appeals to  ‘ grammar ’ as appeals to 
a set of externally imposed rules that one must robotically follow, and many 
(perhaps still in thrall to traditional modes of philosophizing) succumb to this 
very temptation. If one does so succumb, however, one has ignored Wittgenstein ’ s 
explicit cautionary remarks and misunderstood the relevant elements of 
therapeutic practice that Wittgenstein seeks to incorporate into the practice of 
philosophy.  ‘ Grammar ’ marks the locus of the diffi  cult work of aligning oneself 
with the language one inherits but in a way that is always open to disputation, 
clarifi cation and innovation. Grammar is something we create as much as we 
discover it. Grammar is something we  do . 
 Th ere is a scientistic desire that leads some 14 to see grammar to be independent 
of consent , or to acknowledge the role of consent, but then to, in practice, ignore 
it. Succumbing to this desire would lead one to practice a kind of grammatical 
conventionalism and determinism: where grammatical rules are read off 
a stock of uses and these rules then determine meaning. Understood in this 
way, appeals to grammatical rules become akin to appeals to laws, which exist 
independently of those to whom they apply. Th e danger in treating grammar as 
if it were independent of consent comes from the extent to which the humanity 
or, indeed,  ‘ autonomy ’ of language users comes to be downplayed, ignored or, 
indeed, occluded. 
 We propose that one resist the temptation to conceptualize  ‘ grammar ’ in such 
a way that its arbiters  – people  – lose their autonomy. Rather than making a 
claim  – vouchsafi ng an opinion or thesis  – that  ‘ Grammar is autonomous ’, and 
so running the risk of seeing it as a kind of system within which individuals are 
powerless, one might seek a proper acknowledgement of human mental/linguistic 
autonomy and power as urging that one acknowledge the person- and occasion-
sensitive conception of grammar as philosophically crucial and invaluable. 
14 Including (we would suggest) even some well-known  ‘ Wittgensteinians ’. We fi ll out this suggestion, 
and name names, in our forthcoming book,  Liberatory Philosophy. 
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 In fact, when one reads the appeal to grammar in Wittgenstein adequately  – as 
requiring the consent of the speaker  – then one sees that the project of answering 
the question as to what meaning is cannot be something that Wittgenstein 
undertook. For what a word means, in a large class of cases, comes down to 
the use to which someone puts it when he or she uses the language (PI,  § 43). 
Th e use to which a speaker puts the word will be such that it can in principle 
be explained through appeal to  ‘ grammatical rules ’ and the like.  But , again: we 
recommend caution; it can seem natural to take this appeal to use or to rules 
in the wrong way. To help guard against this, consider the following remark of 
Wittgenstein ’ s that one might helpfully hear as sounding a cautionary note: 
 What is it that is repulsive in the idea that we study the use of a word, point to 
mistakes in the description of this use and so on? First and foremost one asks 
oneself: How could that be so important to us? It depends on whether what 
one calls a  ‘ wrong description ’ is a description which does not accord with 
established usage  – or one which does not accord with the practice of the person 
giving the description.  Only in the second case does a philosophical conﬂ ict arise. 
(RPP I,  § 549; our emphasis) 
 Th e descriptions, or uses or rules  – the rules that proff er forth meaning  – are not 
akin to, not shadows cast by, nor are they modelled on, the laws of nature; rather, 
they are the rules  that a speaker states (or could state, or could assent to) as a rule 
of  his language . (cf. VoW, 103 – 5). To emphasize this, to emphasize the  practice 
of language, including its always being open to newness, to reconception by the 
speaker, is  to leave behind the idea that the outsider-philosopher can usefully 
come in with a theory, or even a pre-established account, of the grammar of a 
term and trump the language user(s) in question. It is to begin the novel project 
of returning philosophical authority to the everyday. Th at is, of  equalizing the 
dialectical situation existing between the philosopher and his or her  ‘ patient ’, 15 of 
giving up the pretension to have some superior place in a hierarchy of knowledge 
concerning (say) language use  – and, rather, as we might put it, fi nding everyday 
language to be  ‘ its own master ’, truly to take care of itself  –  ‘ through ’ us. Put 
another way, we might suggest that what concerns Wittgenstein is the logical 
consistency of philosophical practice. A philosopher does not need, is not 
required of necessity, to employ words in accordance with conventional usage on 
15 Th us the deepest affi  nity between Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy, on the one hand, and 
psychoanalysis, on the other, is arguably with the later Sandor Ferenczi, more than with Freud  – 
with Ferenczi ’ s groundbreaking concept of  ‘ mutual therapy ’ / ‘ mutual analysis ’. A latter-day inheritor 
of Ferenczi ’ s mantle here is the Co-Counselling movement. 
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pain of lapsing into nonsense but, rather, needs to be logically consistent in his 
or her philosophical practice. Equivocating on  ‘ process ’ when talking of mental 
processes, or fi nding oneself unwilling to commit to a rule for the use of the term 
process, in the phrase  ‘ mental process ’, is to be, in practice, logically inconsistent. 
 We are most defi nitely not proposing that this ought to be taken for a relativist 
thesis about language or meaning. Neither is it an intentionalist thesis, which 
claims meaning to be conveyed exclusively by or directly responsive only to the 
pre-existing intentions of the language user. Rather, we propose that this move 
is a radical reorientation of one ’ s centre of attention in philosophy, of one ’ s  focus . 
For what we are saying includes that  everything that  we are saying (if we are, 
in fact,  saying anything) is only true inasmuch as it is ultimately taken to be 
so by our interlocutor. Th e philosopher as would-be expert must stand aside, 
and let the enculturated individual who is using the term in question come 
to equilibrium concerning how he or she is willing to commit to a particular 
usage. Th e assistance off ered in this process is akin to midwifery, not expert-
instruction, nor dictation. Th is, we propose, is what it means to take the radical 
turn in philosophy ’ s evolution that Wittgenstein off ered. In a way, it involves the 
dissolving 16 of philosophy into the ongoing, always ethical practice of everyday 
living. 17 
 In terms of exegesis, the point (if that is the right word) is about the status of 
the term  ‘ grammar ’ in Wittgenstein ’ s writings: To what use does Wittgenstein 
put that term? Th e point is not to advance another account of meaning, or an 
a-contextual defi nition of the term  ‘ grammar ’. Rather, the point is that if we are 
to know what the language user meant by their words, if we are to determine the 
grammar of their language, we can only do so  ‘ with the consent of a speaker. Th e 
rule for a sign, then, is the rule which the speaker  commits himself to ’ (VoW, 105). 
We need to gain the speaker ’ s consent regarding the grammar of the language 
they are using  – the rules in accordance with which they are using their words. 
16 Cf. this, from that other prophet of Modernism, Karl Marx:  ‘ Th e philosophers have only to dissolve 
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it as 
the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in 
themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only  manifestations of actual life ’ (Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels,  Th e German Ideology , in  Collected Works , vol. 5 (New York: International 
Publishers, 1976), 447). Th is remark intriguingly anticipates Wittgenstein ’ s own emphasis on  ‘ the 
everyday ’. See also on this https://libcom.org/library/when-language-goes-holiday-philosophy-anti-
philosophy-marx-wittgenstein . 
17 We do not, of course, mean by this that everyday life always involves ethical as opposed to  un ethical 
behaviour. Rather, we mean to index what the ethnomethodologists capture (and that was already 
an insight of Wittgenstein ’ s in TLP): the way in which ordinary life is  saturated by ethics. Th e way 
that members-of-society ’ s practices can be seen as always having an accountable ethical aspect, even 
if it is oft en suppressed or taken for granted. 
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 We propose that ultimately one must take the language users as the fi nal 
arbiters on the grammar of the terms they employ in philosophical discourse, 
principally because this needs to be the case for therapy to  work . Why? Because, 
for hitherto-unconscious assumptions or  ‘ pictures ’ of how things must be, to be 
brought to consciousness in such a manner that they lose their power over one, 
 it must be the person suﬀ ering the  ‘ mental cramp ’ that freely comes to acknowledge 
the picture . (Otherwise, whatever remains repressed  – whatever in the resolution 
of the mental cramp is not acknowledged freely  – will merely remain, and 
return.) Dialogue with that person presupposes much mutual understanding 
and what Wittgenstein calls (cf. PI,  § § 240 – 2)  ‘ agreement ’, and it presupposes 
also a genuine  commitment on the part of that person; but for it to be  dialogue , 
as opposed to simply an impositional monologue coming from us, such freedom 
must be preserved. 
 1 A last word 
 We have explicated Wittgenstein on grammar; we have shown how this usually 
misunderstood term in Wittgenstein ’ s lexicon actually takes one in the opposite 
direction from theory or from language-policing, and potentially into a fl uid 
realm of  ‘ experimental ’ forms of writing, in the service of a thinking that would 
liberate. What then of Wittgenstein applied specifi cally to thinking the writing 
of literary modernism? 
 Here we fi nd some of the most powerful writings to be those of a 
Wittgensteinian lettrist: James Guetti. It was Guetti ’ s contention that Wittgenstein 
did not provide anything so clunky as a literary theory. Rather, Wittgenstein 
provided what might be called a framework, to be judged primarily by its utility, 
for thinking about how literature works, and thus for seeing it (or, better, hearing 
it) as it is. Guetti ’ s Wittgensteinian presentations of authors such as Hemingway 
and Faulkner, Hart Crane and Wallace Stevens enabled literature to be fully 
present. Wittgenstein made aspects audible that were otherwise liable to be 
silenced (in part, by the very rush to Th eory). Wittgenstein ’ s work on  ‘ seeing-as ’ 
and  ‘ meaning-blindness ’ was a key inspiration for Guetti. 18 Uttering a word is 
like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination 19  – sometimes. Th ose 
18 See, especially, his  ‘ Idling Rules. Th e Importance of Part II of  Philosophical Investigations ’, 
 Philosophical Investigations 16, no. 3 (July 1993): 179 – 97. 
19 See PI,  § 7. 
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occasions are occasions when a word is being heard for more than its practical 
use. Guetti sought to bring out the way in which words in literature are typically 
or even quintessentially words  on display  – showing, if you will, more than 
saying. Th at is, indeed, where (when) literature, in Guetti ’ s conception, begins. It 
is most certainly an important moment in literary modernism. 
 In sum, then: One has  to take responsibility for one ’ s words, and this is 
another way of putting the point about being  committed to what one means, 
quoted from Wittgenstein above. A speaker is committed to what his or her 
words mean  – and only  this , and not a philosopher ’ s pet theory or reading of 
the language, tells us what we need to know about grammar, hereabouts  – in the 
word  ‘ grammar ’. Wittgenstein helps us to appreciate the works of the modernist 
literary masters, by helping us to appreciate their sounds of  – or at least as much 
as their senses, their form as constituting so much of their content. And when 
we appreciate Wittgenstein himself as a kind of post-literary modernist 20  – as 
someone who chose carefully the placing of every single word, as someone 
who sought to radically modernize the practice of philosophy by fi guring it as 
a process of therapy or liberation by means of the very thing that would enslave 
thought/us  – language  – then we are in a position to avoid misunderstanding 
any longer Wittgenstein ’ s use of the term  ‘ grammar ’. Contrary to the widespread 
understanding of his work, grammar is not what one is imprisoned by, for 
Wittgenstein. Grammar is something we  – we philosophers, and we ordinary 
members of society  –  do . 
20 A category that has then nothing to do with  ‘ post-modernism ’. Lest we be misunderstood by our 
favourable references to modernism in this article, we should also note here that there are also key 
aspects of Wittgenstein ’ s thought that are not only anti-post-modernist, but also anti-modernist. See, 
for example, Read ’ s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEPcQ6sIOTY; Read ’ s  ‘ On Philosophy ’ s 
(lack of) Progress: From Plato to Wittgenstein ’, in  Wittgenstein and Plato: Connections, Comparisons 
and Contrasts, eds. Luigi Perissinotto, Bego ñ a Ram ó n C á mara (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013); and the close of Cora Diamond ’ s  ‘ Ethics, Imagination and the Method of the Tractatus ’, in Th e 
New Wittgenstein, eds. A. Crary and R. Read (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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